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The purpose of this research is to investigate various income smoothing detection methods.  Using a 
SEC identified sample of firms that were charged with violations of GAAP due to earnings manipula-
tions and a matched sample of firms, we test seven popular models to determine which provide the 
best identification of income smoothing. 
 
The results indicate that, while there is no significant difference between six of the seven detection me-
thods, the Dechow et al. method provides different results. We found the Dechow, et al. method to be 
significantly different in detecting smoothing, although this method was different only because it de-
tected 25 out of the total of 28 firms as income smoothing firms.  Our results indicate that many more 
of the matched sample appear to be income smoothing firms and fewer of the SEC sample appear to 
smooth income. 
 
We think these results indicate that researchers should be cautious in their conclusions.  While these 
methods provide differing results, they also provide insight into the various aspects of income smooth-
ing and the resulting effect on earnings.  Therefore this research has provided insight into the differ-
ent income smoothing detection models, while also indicating that different methods are not equally 
suited to determine all forms of income smoothing.  The appropriate methodology must be chosen to 




1.  Introduction 
 
ver the last few years, several academic and business writers have concluded that companies sometimes try to 
smooth or manage their reported earnings.  During the same period, the role of reported earnings in the mar-
ket place has notably increased.  Today, if a company's earnings per share misses its analysts' forecast by only 
one cent, a company's stock price can fall by several points [Fox 1997, 78].  As DeAngelo et al. [1996, 348] point out the 
market price drop can be especially severe if a company has had a pattern of consistent earnings increases. 
 
 Because of potential adverse market reactions, companies often take unusual actions to avoid reporting losses.  
Hayn [1995, 132] states that "results suggest that firms whose earnings are expected to fall just below the zero earnings 
point engage in earnings manipulations to help them cross the `red line' for the year."  In a recent study of over 64,000 
observations, Burgstahler and Dichev [1997, 124] estimate that 30% to 44% of companies with "slightly negative pre-
managed earnings exercise discretion to report positive earnings." 
 
 It is not simply the stock market that reacts to reported earnings, for a company's cost of capital often is related 
to the consistency of its earnings.  In fact, recent studies [e.g., Dechow et al. 1996, 1] have shown that "an important mo-
tivations for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low cost."  With increased market reac- 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
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tions to missed earnings forecasts and the nearly constant need of corporations for external financing, companies, in the 
future, will have greater incentives to manage earnings.  Thus, the development of models that will reliably detect in-
come smoothing or earnings management in individual companies becomes very important.  In this paper, we evaluate 
seven models that have been proposed as methods to detect the management or smoothing of earnings. 
 
 However, as Katherine Schipper [1989, 92] points out, what detection's models should identify is actually "dis-
closure management" which she defines as "a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the 
intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)."  This 
definition recognizes the fact that income smoothing can be real or artificial.  Real smoothing is the action management 
takes in response to changes in economic conditions.  For example, increased consumer demand normally results in in-
creased sales, increased costs, and increased receivables.  In contrast, artificial smoothing is a "deliberate" action taken 
by management to alter the revenue or cost streams [Imhoff 1981, 24].  For example, the intentional shifting of sales 
from one period to another artificially increases the revenues and receivables of one period. 
 
 Thus, a successful smoothing model must distinguish between the deliberate actions of management to manipu-
late earnings and the actions of management in response to changing economic conditions.  However, many smoothing 
models have concentrated on identifying smoothing attempts within a sample of companies and not on identifying indi-
vidual companies that smooth.  Potentially, this may create a problem, for as Schipper [1989, 97] points out, a model 
may "document statistically a pattern of behavior consistent with earnings management within the sample, without being 
able to say with confidence whether earnings were managed for any particular firm in the sample."  Accordingly, in eva-
luating the precision of a smoothing model, one must ensure that the model detects earnings management not only within 
a sample but that it can detect smoothing attempts within a company, especially when significant manipulations have oc-
curred.  For the greater success a model has in identifying deliberate manipuation, of course, the greater the strength the 
model has. 
 
 One difficulty in testing smoothing models, for their accuracy in identifying individual companies, is the prob-
lem of positively identifying companies that have manipulated earnings, against which to test the models.  However, in 
their 1995 study on earnings detection and their 1996 study on the consequences of earnings manipulation, Dechow et al. 
propose that companies targeted by the SEC for overstating their reported earnings should provide ("on average") a reli-
able list of companies that have manipulated their earnings.  Using this list of companies, they write [Dechow et al. 1995, 
194] one can "evaluate the relative performance of the competing models by comparing the specification and power of 
commonly used test statistics." 
 
 Feroz et al. [1991] in their study of the financial and market effects of SEC's Enforcement Releases provide de-
tailed descriptions of the types of accounting manipulations that attract the SEC's attention and the actions the SEC may 
take in reaction to such problems.  In examining 224 Enforcement Releases, Feroz et al. [1991, 126] found that the agen-
cy is most likely to "pursue alleged disclosure violations dealing with premature revenue recognition or overstatements 
of current assets."  Feroz et al. [1991, 108] also found that most of the SEC's financial cited violations involve major ma-
nipulations of earnings with the income effect on reported earnings averaging more than 50%.  After their examination 
of firms subject to SEC Enforcement Actions, Dechow et al. [1996, 7] write: "it is reasonable to assume that firms facing 
enforcement actions by the SEC knowingly and intentionally engaged in earnings manipulation."   
 
 Thus, if as Dechow et al. [1996, 2] assume, the SEC has correctly identified strong instances of earnings man-
agement, the cited companies provide a known core group or test group against which to evaluate smoothing identifica-
tion models.  However, this core differs from the samples used in many past smoothing studies in two ways.  The core 
consists of specific companies not groupings and the companies are labeled as known smoothers.  Past smoothing studies 
often attempted to statistically identify a pattern of income smoothing or earnings management within classifications 
such as Compustat Tapes [Beidleman 1973, Imhoff 1981, Albrecht 1990], import relief beneficiaries [Jones 1991], man-
agement buyouts [Perry and Williams 1994], initial public offerings [Aharony et al. 1993], chemical companies [Dascher 
and Malcom 1970], or firms reporting accounting changes [Moses 1987].  Companies identified by the model were 
deemed smoothers.  Thus identified, these smoothers often were utilized as a basis for examinations of other aspects of 
smoothing such as (a) reasons for smoothing (e.g., higher market valuations, lower borrowing costs, management com-
pensation), (b) objects of smoothing (operating income, net income), or (c) smoothing variables (research and develop-
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ment, tax credits, accruals).  However, with the use of SEC listed companies, the sample consists of known smoothers, 
and the question becomes whether or not a smoothing model will reliably identify the companies as smoothers. 
 
 As this core group may be said to consist of earnings "manipulators," the consistent identification of the mani-
pulators by a smoothing model becomes important.  If a model cannot consistently detect "manipulation" when it has oc-
curred, is it probable that the model will detect the "income smoothing " that many companies employ?  On the use of 
the more typical "income smoothing," Justin Fox in Fortune [1997, 77] writes: "even at the most respected of companies, 
accounting and business decisions are regularly made with smoothing or temporarily boosting earnings in mind." 
 
 Thus, with even the "most respected of companies" utilizing income smoothing, there is a need for procedures 
or models to detect smoothing and if possible the magnitude of the smoothing.  Although studies have been conducted 
on whether or not companies smooth earnings, Dechow et al. [1995, 194] point out: "There is no systematic evidence 
bearing on the relative performance of these alternative models at detecting earnings management."  To rectify this defi-
ciency, Dechow et al. compared five competing models on their ability to detect earnings management in an assumed 
"known" sample of earnings "manipulators."  As discussed, "manipulators" were defined as companies targeted by the 
SEC for allegedly overstating earnings.  The five models selected were considered to be "generally" representative of the 
models utilized in previous earnings management studies. 
 
 In their comparison of the five models, Dechow et al. [1995, 223] found "all the models considered appear to 
produce reasonably well specified tests for a random sample of event-years."  However, none of the models were com-
pletely successful in detecting earnings management "in firm-years experiencing extreme financial performance."  Thus, 
after examining these representative models, Dechow et al. concluded: "Further research to develop models that generate 
better specified and more powerful tests will enhance our ability to detect earnings management." 
 
 The purpose of this research is to investigate the relative predictive ability of various smoothing models or de-
tection methods.  After reviewing the relevant literature, we have selected seven of the methods that have previously 
found evidence of income smoothing or earnings management.  Obviously the classification of firms that do and do 
not smooth income will vary from model to model, based upon differing classificatory variables and methodologies. 
Our objective is to test these seven models to determine which provide the best identification of income smoothers 
and compare the results to a matched sample of firms. 
 
2.  Data 
 
 We use a sample of firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) for alleged violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles due to earnings manipulations 
provided by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996].
1
  The Dechow, et al. [1996] final sample contained 92 firms from 
April 1982 to December 1992.  We require that complete Compustat data be available for all firms for all testing 
methodologies described in the next section.  This stipulation reduces our final sample to 14 firms.  For comparison 
of testing methods, we match this sample of 14 firms with a qualified random sample of 14 firms.  Our criteria re-
quire that the SEC sample be matched by total assets and SIC.  To match the firms, we reviewed Compustat for 
those firms that minimize the difference in total assets, while maintaining, at a minimum, the two-digit SIC.  The da-
ta used in the analysis are obtained from Compustat for the SEC sample and the matched sample firms for the nine-
teen-year time period 1978 through 1996.  This time period was the longest time period that provided adequate data 
on the relevant variables and was also selected to allow a sufficient number of years to calculate the variables neces-
sary to detect income smoothing or earnings management. The full sample of 28 firms are presented in  
Exhibit 1. 
 
                                                     
1 The authors would like to thank Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney for providing the SEC dataset used in this research. 
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3.  Methodology 
 
This section details the seven methodologies that have been used currently to test for income smoothing. 
Using the SEC identified sample of income smoothers and a matched sample of firms; we test each of the following 
models for accuracy of identification of income smoothing. The methodologies are described below. 
 
Bitner and Dolan [1996] investigate the relationship between income smoothing and firm value, using To-
bin's q as a measure of market valuation. Their measure of income smoothing uses the reciprocal of the sum of the 
squared residuals (SSQR) from the five-year income trend from Compustat.  The income trend is estimated using 
both net income and operating income to investigate both possible variables.  The smallest values of SSQR represent 
the firms that are exhibiting higher levels of income smoothing. 
 
A popular methodology [used by Eckel (1981), Albrecht and Richardson (1990), Michelson, Jor-
dan-Wagner, and Wootton (1995), and Booth, Kallunki, and Martikainen (1996)] classifies a firm as income 
smoother if: 
 
 CV( I) < CV( S), 
 
where CV( I) is the coefficient of variation of the annual change in income and CV( S) is the coefficient of varia-
tion of the annual change in sales.  To allow for variations in the methods used to estimate income, they evaluate in-
come using several alternative variables: operating income after depreciation, pretax income, income before extraor-
dinary items, and net income.  Values of CV( I)/CV( S) that are between -1 and +1 are an indication of firms that 
smooth income. 
 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995, 1996] review five different models of earnings management. All of 
the models revolve around alternative methods for estimating nondiscretionary accruals. The Modified Jones Model 
[1991], which performs the best, is as follows: 
 
 NDA = 1(1/At-1) + 2(REVt - RECt) + 3(PPEt) 
 
where NDA is the estimated nondiscretionary accruals, A is the total assets in t-1, REV is revenue in t less revenue 
in t-1, scaled by total assets in t-1, REC is net receivables in t less net receivables in t-1, scaled by total assets in t-1, 
and PPE is the gross property, plant, and equipment in t, scaled by total assets in t-1. The coefficients () are esti-
mated from the coefficients (a) from the estimate of total accruals (TA), as follows: 
 
 TA1  = a1(1/At-1) + a2(REVt) + a3(PPEt) 
 
The estimate of total accruals (TA) are obtained from the following: 
 
 TA = ( CA t - CL t - CASH t + STD t - DEP t ) / A t-1 
 
where CA are total current assets, CL are total current liabilities, CASH is cash and equivalents, STD is the change 
in debt included in current liabilities, and DEP is depreciation and amortization expense.  Discretionary accruals are 
calculated from the following: 
 
 DAP it = TA it - NDAP it 
 
where NDAP are the predicted level of nondiscretionary accruals.  Then using DAP from above, the coefficients (a) 
and (b) are estimated from: 
 
 DAP it = a1 + b1PARTjt + ejt 
 
where PART is a partitioning variable that breaks earnings management into two periods, one if from the event pe-
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riod and zero if from the estimation period.  Finally, the coefficient on PART determines the extent of earnings 
management.  If b1  O, then the firm practices earnings management (is an income smoother). 
 
Chaney and Lewis [1994b] and Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley [1987] detect income smoothing using the 
variance ratio (VRi), calculated as: 
 




 Var (CFit) = (CFit – E(CFit))
2
 / (n-1) 
 Var (Niit) = (NIit – E(NIit))
2
 / (n-1) 
 
and using the random walk approach 
 
 E(CFit) = the sample mean of cash from operations from CFit-1 
 E(NIit) = the sample mean of net income before extraordinary items from NIit-1. 
 
 Cash from operations is calculated by subtracting the changes in accounts receivable, inventory, and other 
current assets and adding the changes in accounts payable, taxes payable, and other current liabilities from working 
capital from operations.  The greater the firm's variance ratio, the more likely the firm smooth's income. 
 
Moses [1987] investigates income smoothing using the following model: 
 
 SB = ( PE – EE  - RE -EE)/ Sales 
 
where PE is prechange earnings, RE is reported earnings, and EE is expected earnings using the random walk mod-
el, where EE equals the previous year's PE.  SB is the smoothing behavior and positive values of SB indicate firms 
that smooth income. 
 
Wang and Williams [1994] use a model of stockholder wealth that investigates the absolute value of the 
change in reported income divided by the market value of equity to calculate the smoothing dummy.  If the smooth-
ing dummy is in the smaller 50
th
 percentile of firms, the firm is more likely to be an income smoother. 
 
Lev and Kunitzky [1974] examine the extent of smoothness using the earnings trend: 
 
 G = (1 / (n-1))  xt-1 / xt 
 S = (1/ (n-1))   (xt+1/ xt  - G) / G   
 
where x is earnings, G is the earnings trend, and S is the extent of smoothness. When S is close to zero, the firm 
does not smooth income. 
 
All seven of these methodologies previously found evidence of income smoothing or earnings manage-
ment. Obviously the classification of firms that do and do not smooth income will vary from model to model, based 
upon differing classificatory variables and methodologies. Our objective is to test these seven models to determine 
which provide the best identification of income smoothing or earnings management and compare the results to the 
matched sample of firms. 
 
4.  Results 
 
 Exhibit 2 provides descriptive data on the SEC sample, the matched sample, and the full sample of twenty-eight 
firms.  Note that these variables are means, medians, and standard deviations over each sample over the nineteen-year 
sample period.  Of course total assets are similar across both samples, since total assets were used as one of the matching 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 2, Number 1 
 76 
criteria for the samples.  It is interesting to note that although most of the variables are similar in magnitude, several key 
variables are larger for the SEC sample, as compared to the matched sample.  These variables include the "income re-
lated" variables, such as: income before extraordinary items, operating income after depreciation, pretax income, net in-
come, and sales. 
 
 Exhibit 3 presents summary data on the results of the seven smoothing methodologies.
2
  The firms are listed in 
alphabetical order, with the first set of firms encompassing the SEC sample and the second set of firms are the matched 
sample.  The testing methodologies are indicated by the name of the first author listed for the research article.  If the test 
indicated that the firm was an income smoother, a one is noted for that author and firm.  A zero is noted if the test did not 
detect income smoothing.  The bottom row provides a total count of the number of smoothing firms detected by the par-
ticular methodology.  The "Number" column indicates the number of testing methodologies that detected smoothing for 
a particular firm.  The first obvious observation is that there was no consistency between the detection methods.  If one 
requires four out of the seven methods to detect smoothing, as a true indication of income smoothing, then 17 firms 
should be considered income smoothers.  This would include six in the SEC sample and 11 in the matched sample.  If 
the cut-off is five methods in agreement, then nine firms are smoothers, with three in the SEC sample and six in the 
matched sample.  If six out of the seven methods must agree, only four firms would be considered income smoothers.  It 
is interesting that more firms were considered income smoothers in the matched sample than the SEC sample, since the 
SEC sample encompasses firms that were charged with violations of GAAP due to earnings manipulations.  This differ-
ence is true, even for the Dechow et al. methodology, which provided the SEC sample for this study.  Also notable is the 




 From all appearances, there is no discernable difference between the samples and the methodologies.  To inves-
tigate if there is a difference between the testing methodologies, we use Cochran's Q Test and the Chi-Square Test.  Both 
tests provide the same results, we can reject the hypothesis that the probability of detecting income smoothing or earn-
ings management is the same among testing methods at the five- percent level.  As a comparison, we eliminate the De-
chow, et al. methodology from sample and again utilize the Cochran's Q and Chi-Square tests.  We now find that we can 
not reject the hypothesis that the probability of detecting income smoothing or earnings management is the same among 
the six testing methods at the ten- percent level.  Therefore we have evidence that six of the seven testing methods have 
similar probabilities of detecting income smoothing, while one method is different than the other six.  The Dechow, et al. 
method provides an indication of many more smoothing firms. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
 The purpose of this research is to investigate various income smoothing or earnings management detection me-
thodologies.  Using a SEC identified sample of firms that were charged with violations of GAAP due to earnings mani-
pulations and a matched sample of firms, we test seven popular models to determine which provide the best identifica-
tion of income smoothing.  Our final sample includes 28 firms, 14 from the SEC sample and 14 from the matched sam-
ple. 
 
 The results indicate that, while there is not a significant difference between six of the seven detection methods, 
the Dechow et al. method provides different results.  Several interesting features result from these tests.  First, even 
though there are no discernable differences between six of the tests, the six methods provide different indications of 
smoothing for the same firms, using different methods (i.e. firm A was indicated to be a smoother by test one and a non-
smoother by test two).  We found the Dechow et al. method to be significantly different in detecting earnings manage-
ment or income smoothing, although this method was different only because it detected 25 out of the total of 28 firms as 
                                                     
2 This table is provided as a summary of the seven methodologies used to detect earnings management.  This research requires us to calculate 
each of the seven methods for each firm individually.  The methodology encompasses a large amount of data for each firm and testing method.  
We felt this table best summarizes the results without dwelling on the computations.  The authors will provide the computational information 
upon request. 
3  Since four of the methodologies depend on a rank comparison between firms, the resulting number of smoothing firms is fourteen.  The me-
thods are Cheney, Wang, Lev, and Bitner.  All four of these methods require the relevant variable for a firm to be in the largest or smallest per-
centile of the total sample.  We therefore use 50 percent as the cut-off to rank the firms and determine if they practice earnings management.  We 
use 50 percent since the original hypothesis was to determine if the different smoothing detection methods would provide an indication of income 
smoothing or earnings management between the two samples. 
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earnings managing/income smoothing firms.  Therefore this method indicated that almost 90 percent of the firms were 
managing earnings.  Finally, the tests were performed on two samples; firms with SEC violations and a matched sample 
of unknown firms.  A priori, we would expect the entire SEC sample to test as smoothing firms and only a few of the 
matched sample to be smoothing firms.  Our results indicate otherwise, many more of the matched sample appear to be 
income smoothing firms and fewer of the SEC sample appear to smooth income. 
 
 What does all of this mean?  We think these results indicate a researcher should be cautious in their conclu-
sions.  All of these "previously tested" income smoothing or earnings management detection methods provided differing 
results.  These results should not be considered wrong, but actually an indication that income smoothing or earnings 
management has many different facets.  While one method reviews sales and income, another method investigates dis-
cretionary accruals, and another utilizes expected earnings.  While these methods provide differing results, they also pro-
vide insight into the various aspects of income smoothing and the resulting effect on earnings.  Therefore this research 
has provided insight into the different income smoothing and earnings management detection models, while also indicat-
ing that different methods are not equally suited to determine all forms of income smoothing.  The appropriate metho-
dology must be chosen to address the specific aspects of income smoothing or earnings management that the researcher 
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Exhibit 1
Total Sample of Firms
SEC Firms Matched Firms
DATAPOINT CORP AMDAHL CORP
DSC COMMUNICATIONS CORP ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC
ELECTRO CATHETER CORP BIOSEARCH MEDICAL PRODS INC
FLORAFAX INTERNATIONAL INC MEDICAL STERILIZATION INC
LEXINGTON PRECISION CORP VULCAN INTL CORP
MARSH & MCLENNAN COS ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER
NATIONAL COMPUTER SYS INC GENICOM CORP
OAK INDUSTRIES INC METHODE ELECTRONICS  -CL A
PEPSICO INC SEAGRAM CO LTD
RISK(GEORGE) INDS INC FIRECOM INC
ROCKY MOUNT UNDERGARMENT CO ALBA-WALDENSIAN INC
STORAGE TECHNOLOGY CP  -CL A EMC CORP/MA
TANDEM COMPUTERS INC CONCURRENT COMPUTER CP
UNISYS CORP DIGITAL EQUIPMENT





  Full Sample SEC Sample Matched Sample 
  Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
Assets-Total  2,941.3 248.6 6,160.7 3,031.4 324.1 6,515.8 2,851.2 204.7 6,029.6 
Beta  0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.9 
Current Assets-Total 1,220.5 131.2 2,055.8 981.9 142.7 1,509.2 1,459.2 131.2 2,525.3 
Current Liabilities-Total 844.5 79.6 1,504.5 782.9 79.6 1,445.3 906.1 72.9 1,613.7 
Income Bef Extra Items 72.0 1.8 251.5 135.3 7.9 317.4 8.7 0.9 148.2 
Receivables-Total 499.8 57.8 818.7 446.8 59.6 702.9 552.7 57.8 944.4 
Accounts Payable 253.0 22.2 477.6 234.2 20.6 453.8 271.7 33.5 516.8 
Debt - Total  662.1 65.7 1,785.8 897.3 108.1 2,262.4 426.9 15.1 1,177.3 
Op Income Aft Depreciation 212.7 8.0 650.2 354.0 45.2 892.9 71.5 2.4 194.1 
Pretax Income  128.8 2.3 415.4 225.7 23.1 554.0 31.9 0.3 176.7 
Net Income  73.0 1.6 251.6 137.3 10.8 317.1 8.6 0.9 148.2 
Sales-Net  2,493.4 303.4 6,432.6 3,458.4 317.3 8,327.0 1,528.4 199.5 3,820.3 
Com Shares Outstanding 121.4 26.8 292.8 159.6 16.8 403.2 83.1 38.2 111.0 
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The seven income smoothing or earnings management models are presented in the order of discussion of the paper and are specified by the first author's name. 
NUMBER is the total number of models that detected income smoothing for a specific firm.  Total Smoothers is the total number of firms that the specific income smoothing or 
earnings management model determined to be income smoothers or practicing earnings management. 
A one indicates the firm was detected to be an income smoother and a zero indicates that the firm was not determined to be an income smoother.
Exhibit 3
Summary Data on Seven Earnings Management Models
SEC Firms Michelson Dechow Cheney Moses Wang Lev Bitner Number
DATAPOINT CORP 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
DSC COMMUNICATIONS CORP 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
ELECTRO CATHETER CORP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
FLORAFAX INTERNATIONAL INC 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 5
LEXINGTON PRECISION CORP 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3
MARSH & MCLENNAN COS 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3
NATIONAL COMPUTER SYS INC 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 4
OAK INDUSTRIES INC 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3
PEPSICO INC 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3
RISK(GEORGE) INDS INC 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
ROCKY MOUNT UNDERGARMENT CO 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3
STORAGE TECHNOLOGY CP  -CL A 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
TANDEM COMPUTERS INC 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 6
UNISYS CORP 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4
Matched Firms
SEAGRAM CO LTD 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
VULCAN INTL CORP 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6
ADC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 5
ALBA-WALDENSIAN INC 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 4
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
AMDAHL CORP 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
BIOSEARCH MEDICAL PRODS INC 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
CONCURRENT COMPUTER CP 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 5
EMC CORP/MA 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5
FIRECOM INC 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4
GENICOM CORP 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 4
MEDICAL STERILIZATION INC 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
METHODE ELECTRONICS  -CL A 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6
Total Smoothers 17 25 14 14 14 14 14
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 2, Number 1 
 82 
Notes 
